The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Government Response

John Kruse

Alaska has always been known as “the last frontier” because of its stunning beauty, remote location, and fertile environment.  On March 24th, 1989, at just after 12:00 a.m., all of these Alaskan characteristics were put into jeopardy; the oil tanker Exxon Valdez had run aground.  With sudden speed and voracity, a spreading slick of oil marred Alaska’s beauty.  Her location was no longer as remote as throngs of media, oil company employees, and volunteers streamed to her lands.  The spreading oil ravaged her environment; the effects of which we still do not fully understand today, fifteen years later.

During these tragic events, a catastrophic breakdown of responsibility occurred throughout all organizations involved with the transportation of oil over Alaskan lands and through Alaskan waters.  While the spill is no one party’s fault, blame can be placed on numerous groups including the oil companies, Alyeska Pipeline Company, the shipping companies, and governmental regulatory bodies.

The goal of this paper is to take a broad look at government involvement in Alaskan oil production.  The focus of this paper will be based on two interrelated, yet distinct questions.  First, what role did the United States government (at all levels) play in the chain of events leading to the grounding of the Exxon Valdez?  Many people have accused the government of various levels of responsibility for the spill because of reduced monitoring equipment and personnel at Coast Guard stations as well as a “cozy” relationship between the state government of Alaska and the oil industry.

Secondly, what response has been elicited from the government in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill?  Since the oil spill in 1989, Congress has passed legislation in an attempt to assure that a spill of that magnitude cannot happen again.  In addition, the judicial branch of the United States government has prosecuted the parties liable for the oil spill and has won civil and criminal settlements, whose funds are directed for the remediation of the environment so ravaged by the 1989 spill.

Government Involvement and Initial Response

The causes leading up to the Exxon Valdez oil spill (EVOS) are numerous and have never been blamed entirely on one corporation or entity.  Among the parties guilty of complacency prior to the EVOS are the oil companies, Alyeska Pipeline Company, and the government.  According to Marilyn Leland, Deputy Director of the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council, “the government was definitely part of the problem” (Leland: Personal Interview).

One of main concerns with the government prior to the EVOS was the vessel traffic system (VTS).

The vessel traffic system, a radar system overseen by the Coast Guard and designed to monitor tanker traffic, was in disrepair.  The night of the accident, the system’s watch did not take the trouble to boost radar coverage to follow the Exxon Valdez, even though no other ships were at sea at the time and the vessel had reported ice dangers ahead.  Had the radar tracked the tanker, staff said, the vessel’s collision course would have been detected and the exhausted crew warned of imminent disaster (Whitney 1989: 4).

Concerns over the vessel traffic system were not just based on deficient equipment.  These concerns were founded on staff reductions in the months prior to the accident, as well as equipment downgrades and deficiencies.  Policy issues were also a problem with the VTS.  “…the Coast Guard itself stopped keeping data on ice in the waterway [Prince William Sound] in 1985, even though radar operators knew tankers were increasingly having to swing close to Bligh Reef to avoid it” (Whitney 1989: 4-5).

Additional concerns were present about the state’s decision to change the pilot program for tankers in Prince William Sound (PWS).  State-licensed pilots are required to navigate the ship while in Valdez harbor and the Valdez Narrows.  At the time of the spill, pilots disembarked at Rocky Point (eighteen miles from the port of Valdez).  However, prior to 1980, pilots were required to man the tankers past Rocky Point and Bligh Reef, all the way to Cape Hitchinbrook (forty miles south of Bligh Reef).  The decision to decrease the distance requirement for pilots within PWS was made in 1980 under pressure from the Alaska Pilots Association after one of their vessels sank at Cape Hitchinbrook.  “Had a state pilot been aboard the Exxon Valdez on March 24, 1989, the grounding would not have occurred…” (Whitney 1989: 5).

In the aftermath of the oil spill, it was clear that no one knew what to do.  According to Rick Steiner, University of Alaska Professor and fisherman at the time of the spill, “the state of Alaska didn’t have a clue about what to do” (Steiner: Personal Interview).  However, it wasn’t just the state of Alaska; the EVOS caught everyone by surprise and caught the responsible parties unprepared.  It was clear that no one was communicating with anyone else and that the state was just as uninformed as the rest of the world.  “The state is supposed to be in the decisionmaking [sic] loop, but it seems they are having nearly the same problems as everyone else.  ‘We don’t see anything coming from Exxon,’ said state environmental director Dietrick, ‘…we can’t ever get an answer from them’”(Campbell: 5).  The state seemed content to observe and did not want to involve itself with Exxon’s cleanup efforts, lest it interfere and thus become the responsible party.  However, interfere with the cleanup is just what Exxon contends the state of Alaska did.

Exxon contends that since the Exxon Valdez ran aground, the state of Alaska refused to let the oil company use dispersants.  Steve Cowper, then governor, stated, “there is clearly a campaign here by Exxon and its public relations people to mislead the public into thinking that they could have cleaned this entire thing up if it hadn’t been for the state of Alaska” (Postman “Exxon Chief’s…”: 2).

However, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that these statements and accusations by Exxon were simply attempts to clean up its corporate image by placing the blame elsewhere, such as upon the state of Alaska.  According to Cmdr. Steve McCall, chief Coast Guard officer in Valdez, dispersant use was approved based on a preexisting, government-sanctioned oil spill contingency plan.  According to this contingency plan, Exxon needed no permission to use dispersants in a wide swath of deep water, known as Zone 1, through the center of which the tanker lanes pass (Postman “Exxon Chief’s…”: 3).

Additionally, dispersant tests were conducted in the early hours and days of the spill.  These tests, conducted under the supervision of Frank Iarossi (Exxon Shipping Company President) and government officials showed that the dispersants did not work well in the placid waters of the sound.  “Iarossi and government officials said the dispersants needed at least mild waves to mix with the oil and break it up, but the water was too calm” (Postman “Exxon Chief’s…”: 1).

Although the state of Alaska was relatively docile in the aftermath of the spill, it did exercise its muscle on a few occasions in response to the spill.  In May of 1989, a little over one month after the spill, the state of Alaska openly condemned Exxon’s plan to clean up PWS.  The plan was considered unacceptable because it critically underestimated the serious nature of the oil spill.  The plan was also criticized for being shortsighted and completely ignoring oiled areas outside of PWS (Epler 1989: 1-2).

In early April of 1989, only weeks after the spill, Governor Steve Cowper issued a tough emergency order that outlined what the oil companies must do to keep the oil flowing.  This order required Alyeska Pipeline Company and the oil companies to “substantially upgrade the equipment and personnel for dealing with spills and change the operation of the terminal to lessen the chance of another spill” (Postman “Cowper Threatens…”: 1).  In order to avoid prosecution and the shutdown of the terminal, the oil companies (including Alyeska) were required to:

• Identify in writing the permanent storage locations of all oil spill cleanup equipment within 72 hours of the order being issued.  The equipment cannot be used for anything but spill cleanup and training.
• Designate a 12 person, 24-hour oil spill response crew that does nothing except respond to spills.
• Place containment booms around all tankers in the harbor.
• Allow tankers in and out of port only during daylight hours.
• Load only one tanker at a time until all the clean up equipment is in place.  The companies have 72 hours {from issue of order} to gather all the equipment.
• Have equipment available no later than April 30 {1989} to respond within two hours to a 10 million gallon spill.

(Postman “Cowper Threatens…”: 2)

If the oil companies did not comply, their officials would face criminal prosecution, jail time, and fines of more than $100,000.  Gov. Cowper justified the emergency order by citing huge shortcomings in Alyeska’s Contingency Plan, that had they been implemented as designed would have significantly reduced the effects of the EVOS.  Primarily, Cowper cited the fact that Alyeska:

• did not surround the Exxon Valdez with containment boom until more than 72 hours had elapsed after the spill.
• took too long to move equipment to the site of the EVOS.
• took no action to prevent spilled oil from hitting communities or sensitive wildlife areas.

(Postman “Cowper Threatens…”: 3)

Judicial Response

The judicial branches of the federal government and the state of Alaska were both active in the months and years following the EVOS.  The state of Alaska was the first government body to file suit when it submitted its civil suit on August 15th, 1989.  The suit was filed against Exxon and the owners of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline system (TAPS) charging that they “grossly deceived the public about their ability to move crude oil safely, or to clean it up when they failed” (Mauer: 1).

The civil suit filed by the state of Alaska sought “yet to be determined damages for the environmental, economic, and social harm caused by the March 24 {1989} grounding of the Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound.”  It also sought “additional monetary punishment for the defendants’ ‘intentional and negligent’ actions before and after the 11 million gallon oil spill…”(Mauer: 1).  The picture painted by the lawsuit was one of grim destruction of Alaska’s resources across the board; from subsistence fishing losses to contaminated archeological remains, and from lost tourism revenues to increased governmental expenditures.  Additionally, the government demanded compensation for the people of Alaska for emotional distress suffered from having witnessed the destruction of their pristine habitat and environment (Mauer: 2).

The suit also went on to allege that Exxon and all other companies involved in the building of the TAPS and Valdez terminal had misled the public from day one.  In order to win the permits necessary to build the pipeline and terminal:

Exxon and the other oil companies promised to take all action necessary to ensure a major spill would not occur.  They further represented that they would utilize the best available oilspill [sic] containment and cleanup technology and that, if an oil spill did occur, they would be able to contain and clean up the oil spill.  (Mauer: 2-3)

The state of Alaska charged that on the 24th of March 1989, the exact opposite of the above promise took place.  The suit states:

Defendants’ inability to respond to the oil spill was due in large part to defendants’ conscious, deliberate, negligent and reckless decisions to save money by reducing manpower, training, equipment, and maintenance of equipment below those levels which defendants knew, or should have known, were necessary to respond to a major oil spill. (Mauer: 3)

This civil suit filed by the state of Alaska was long anticipated and was pursued by the government of Alaska for its people.  The suit was eventually settled with Exxon in conjunction with the federal government’s criminal suit.  The settlement will be discussed after the outlining of the federal government’s criminal lawsuit.

On February 27th, 1990, the federal government indicted Exxon Corporation and its shipping subsidiary, Exxon Shipping Company, on criminal charges stemming from the grounding of the ship Exxon Valdez on Bligh Reef March 24, 1989.  Exxon was accused of two felony charges and three misdemeanor charges which could have won the federal government more than $600 million in fines and damages under a federal law allowing the government to collect up to twice the amount of money a company spent on cleanup and claims.  U.S. Attorney General at the time, Dick Thornburgh “characterized the indictment as the toughest charges his office felt it could prove, adding that the indictment ‘throws the environmental book at Exxon’” (Epler 1990: 1-2).

Exxon stood accused of one felony charge of violating the Dangerous Cargo Act by employing staff and crewmembers that were mentally and physically incapable of performing their assigned duties.  The second felony account alleged that Exxon failed to make sure that the helm of the Exxon Valdez was “constantly manned” by competent and appropriate crew members (Epler 1990: 1-2).  Exxon was also charged with three misdemeanor charges including discharging pollutants without a permit and killing migratory birds without a permit.

Important to this federal suit was the fact that the indictment did not affect ongoing and future civil claims against Exxon or Alyeska Pipeline Company.  This was important because multiple civil cases were currently pending against both Exxon and Alyeska Pipeline Company, including the state of Alaska’s civil suit (Epler 1990: 3).

Both government lawsuits, the state of Alaska’s civil suit and the federal government’s criminal suit, were settled in October of 1991.  The settlement with Exxon provided for a $1 billion monetary settlement that covered both the criminal fines and restitution and civil damages.  The settlement discussed here does not include an additional $125 million in fines that were forgiven by the court in recognition of Exxon’s cooperation in cleaning up the spill and paying private settlements (Frost “2nd spill…”: 1-2). 

The criminal portion of the plea provided $125 million to the federal government in fines and restitution.  Of the $125 million, $25 million went into the federal treasury to cover costs incurred during the cleanup and legal proceedings.  The remaining $100 million of the criminal settlement was given to the restoration of PWS (Frost “Judge OKs…”: 1-2).

The civil case was given the remaining $900 million of the $1 billion settlement.  The settlement provided for a 10-year installment plan payout of the $900 million in amounts of $90 million per year.  The civil portion of the settlement also contained a $100 million “reopener clause.”  This clause allows for an additional $100 million from Exxon “to restore resources that suffered a substantial loss or decline as a result of the oil spill, the injuries to which could not have been known or anticipated…(EVOS TC: 2).

The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council (EVOS TC) was formed “to oversee restoration of the injured ecosystem through the use of the $900 million civil settlement” (EVOS TC: 3).  This trustee council consists of three federal representatives and three state representatives, all from the government.  The specific departments appointed are:

• The commissioner of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game.
• The commissioner of the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation.
• The Attorney General from the Alaska Department of Law
• The Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior
• The Director of the National Oceanographic and Atmosphere Administration.
• The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Legislative Response

Within weeks after the EVOS, legislators in Washington were already introducing new, more stringent laws for consideration.  These laws were designed to toughen federal penalties for spills and to promote faster federal intervention in oil spill cleanups.  The crown jewel of all proposed legislation was the Oil Pollution Act, which passed in 1990 and has become known as the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (or just OPA 90 for short) (Whitney 1989: 1).

OPA 90 was passed on August 18, 1990 and was formally known as “an act to establish limitations on liability for damages resulting from oil pollution, to establish a fund for the payment of compensation for such damages, and for other purposes” (OPA 90: Stat. 484).  OPA 90 provided improved legislation across the board for dealing with the aftermath of oil spills.

The changes in legislation as a result of OPA 90 were broad and involved the modification of much existing legislation.  Changes in legislation included:

Also included in OPA 90 were specific provisions for the improvement of the TAPS as well as for improvements and regulation changes specifically within PWS.

OPA 90 provided for the establishment of an Oil Spill Recovery Institute in PWS to:

OPA 90 also provided for two oversight and advisory councils to oversee oil trafficking in PWS and Cook Inlet.  These groups were set up with funding from the oil companies not to exceed $2 million per year for the PWS group and not to exceed $1 million per year for the Cook Inlet group.  These groups were given access to all oil company facilities, including tankers and were responsible for making recommendations on safe operation to the oil companies themselves and to the government.  The groups in their present state are the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council and the Cook Inlet Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council.  These two groups continue to monitor the oil industry presence in PWS to this day (OPA 90: Stat. 544-53).

OPA 90 also provided for a few other smaller, but equally important, changes in PWS.  According the act, an automated navigational light was placed on Bligh Reef with sufficient height and power to provide a long distance warning of the reef’s location.  Additionally, OPA 90 required that by the year 2015 all tankers operating in Alaskan waters be of double-hull construction.  Also, the act required that the Vessel Traffic Service install new equipment, whether radar or satellite, which would allow the Coast Guard and VTS to monitor tankers throughout PWS, not just to Bligh Reef as the previous radar system update had provided (OPA 90: Stat. 553-4).

Conclusion

The government response to the EVOS can be viewed in many different lights, depending on what is desired from the analysis, as is the case with most any complex event.  Separate analysis of the government response at the different levels is the most logical and fair method for this particular case.

The government response to the EVOS at the local level was marginal at best.  This is not a statement of the effort or intent of local authorities, however, the effects of local government response in this case are negligible, if any.  During the research conducted to formulate this paper, very little mention was made of any local response other than that of “stepping aside” to allow state and federal officials to move in and take over.  This was likely not the fault of the local authorities or the result of any lack of talent or ability.  The lack of effective response at the local level seems to be caused by the overwhelming nature of the oil spill and the fact that before an effective response could be initiated, state and federal officials had already arrived.

Also important to the analysis of the local government response is the role of the oil companies and Alyeska Pipeline Company in the local communities.  Most communities assumed that the oil companies and Alyeska stood behind their contingency plans and were prepared to respond in a time-effective and satisfactory manner.  The bottom line is that the local governments, as a collective, were complacent and were happy to trust that the oil companies and Alyeska were adequately prepared for the cleanup of an oil spill, which has been proven not to have been the case.  Therefore, some of the blame for a negligible response on the part of the local government belongs to Alyeska and the oil companies.

The governmental response to the EVOS at the state level has been much more significant.  In the immediate aftermath of the spill, although the state played a limited role in cleanup and oversight; officials were there, ready and prepared to help.  The limited role the state played in the cleanup can be accounted for by Exxon’s willingness to take control of the cleanup and to open its pocketbooks to do so.  If the state had interfered with Exxon’s cleanup (which was alleged by Exxon but never substantiated), Exxon could have claimed that its attempts to clean up the spill had been interfered with or halted by the state government and could have then claimed that it was no longer liable for the spill cleanup, organizationally or financially.  The state was not willing to risk this sort of possibility and was happy to assume an oversight role, approving or disproving Exxon’s efforts and observing the entire process.

The state government has been very effective in responding to the oil spill on a long-term basis.  The state of Alaska filed and won a civil suit in the name of its people and environment and won a $1 billion settlement.  The settlement has been used for a variety of purposes including the remediation of PWS and its ecosystem as well as the protection of other sensitive habitats and lands.  The $1 billion settlement has been the single most effective tool for ongoing monitoring and restoration of PWS.  Without the state of Alaska and the civil suit it filed, the present day situation in PWS could be much worse.

The response of the federal government to the EVOS has been largely positive.  This is especially important considering the fact that the federal government was essential in many of the steps and breakdowns leading to the EVOS.  Without federal approval, oil would never have been drilled in Alaska in the first place.  While this is not a fault, it is important to remember that the federal government has a huge stake in Alaskan oil production, both politically and economically.  The federal government was also responsible for the downgrades of Coast Guard facilities and reductions in Coast Guard staff that were factors in the EVOS.

Those negative aspects noted, the federal government has made several highly important and highly positive responses to the EVOS.  The largest of these positive federal responses to the EVOS is the passing of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.  OPA 90 changed the face of oil production in U.S. marine environments.  Many stringent new standards were passed and new enforcements provided for existing legislation.  In addition to new standards and enforcements, changes were made in the PWS region.  For example, existing radar systems were upgraded and a navigational marker was placed on Bligh Reef to prevent future accidents.

The federal government response to the EVOS was also positive in the criminal conviction of Exxon Corporation.  It set a legal precedent that oil companies and their subsidiaries can be held both financially responsible and criminally negligent for an oil spill.  The legal precedent set by the federal government’s criminal suit sets the standard by which all oil companies are held for spills occurring in U.S. waters.

On the whole, the government response, at all levels, to the EVOS can teach us many important lessons.  It is important that the government never again becomes complacent and trusts the oil companies to keep their word.  It is also important to be prepared with detailed contingency plans for all possible spill types and locations.  Despite the tragic effects on the Alaskan environment, much was learned from the EVOS.  Without a doubt, the PWS region is now much better equipped for the possibility of an oil spill and is highly trained to prevent spills in the first place.  In the event of another spill, the government response will be much more organized and effective, thanks to pieces of legislation, such as OPA 90, and the experience of government employees.  Prevention is also much more of a priority now than it was in the time prior to the EVOS.  In the long run, after all the analysis is complete, the government response to the EVOS is reduced to a simple concept.  A priceless lesson in oil spill prevention and response was learned.  Unfortunately, this lesson was learned the hard way, through tragic, catastrophic experience.

Works Cited

Campbell, Larry. 1989. “Frustration Grows Over Exxon Efforts.” Anchorage Daily News, April 1: A1. Available online: http://www.adn.com/evos/stories/EV166.html

Epler, Patti. 1989. “State Says Exxon Plan Is ‘Unacceptable’.” Anchorage Daily News, May 5: A1. Available online: http://www.adn.com/evos/stories/EV149.html

Epler, Patti. 1990. “Federal Grand Jury Indicts Exxon.” Anchorage Daily News, February 28: A1. Available online: http://www.adn.com/evos/stories/EV373.html

Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council. 2003.  “2003 Status Report.” 

Fineberg, Richard A. 2004. “ExxonMobil Corporation, Its Alaska Operations and the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Background Report.” March 24.

Frost, George. 1991. “2nd Spill Settlement Looks Like The 1st.” Anchorage Daily News, October 1: A1. Available online: http://www.adn.com/evos/stories/EV338.html

Frost, George. 1991. “Judge OKs Oil Spill Settlement.” Anchorage Daily News, October 9: A1. Available online: http://www.adn.com/evos/stories/EV381.html

LeLand, Marilyn. Personal Interview. Anchorage, April 30, 2004.

Mauer, Richard. 1989. “State Sues Exxon.” Anchorage Daily News, August 16: A1. Available online: http://www.adn.com/evos/stories/EV404.html

Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. no. 101-380, 104 Stat 484-575 (1990).

Postman, David.  1989. “Exxon Chief’s Statements Don’t Square With Facts.” Anchorage Daily News, April 29: A1. Available online: http://www.adn.com/evos/stories/EV163.html

Postman, David. 1989. “Cowper Threatens To Close Oil Terminal.” Anchorage Daily News, April 6: A1. Available online: http://www.adn.com/evos/stories/EV158.html

“Sound Gets Radar System.” Anchorage Daily News, December 16: B3. Available online: http://www.adn.com/evos/stories/EV326.html

Steiner, Rick.  Personal Interview.  Anchorage, May 1, 2004.

Whitney, David. 1989. “Congress Responds To Spill With Talks Of Tougher Penalties.” Anchorage Daily News, April 5: A6. Available online: http://www.adn.com/evos/stories/EV274.html

Whitney, David. 1990. “NTSB Spreads The Blame For Oil Spill.” Anchorage Daily News, August 1: A1. Available online: http://www.adn.com/evos/stories/EV286.html

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